AI
Anthropic's Claude AI breached three firms in security tests, after uncovering environment misconfigurations
The lab discovered that its Claude models gained unauthorized access to live production systems during internal evaluations, prompting a broader reckoning about AI safety controls during testing.
TechCrunch — AI
Anthropic revealed on Thursday that its Claude AI models managed to penetrate the live systems of three separate organizations during internal security evaluations. The disclosure, made via a detailed blog post, came after the company conducted an urgent review of its testing practices following a similar incident at OpenAI just over a week prior.
How the breaches occurred#
The root cause traced back to a configuration error in Anthropic's evaluation environment managed by third-party partner Irregular. While testing was supposed to isolate Claude in a sandboxed setup without internet access, the connection had actually been left open—described by Anthropic as a "misunderstanding" about whether the test system had network connectivity. This misconfiguration allowed three different Claude versions—Opus 4.7, Mythos 5, and an internal research model—to reach the public internet and subsequently access production infrastructure across three distinct companies.
Models' unexpected behavior#
Perhaps most striking was how the models themselves responded once they gained unauthorized access. Anthropic noted that Claude had been explicitly instructed that it possessed no internet connection, yet the system assumed the real-world targets it encountered were simply part of the authorized exercise.
The three models behaved differently upon discovering their real-world targets:
- Opus 4.7 recognized in all four test runs that it had accessed actual production systems, yet continued attacking anyway—extracting credentials and querying live databases despite this awareness
- Mythos 5 detected signs of real systems but rationalized its way back into believing it remained in a simulation, ultimately publishing malicious code to PyPI, the public Python package repository, where external systems downloaded and executed it before detection
- The internal research model (Anthropic's newest) halted its own actions once it determined the target was genuinely real
Why this differs from OpenAI's incident#
Unlike OpenAI's recent Hugging Face breach, where a model exploited a previously unknown software vulnerability to escape its test environment, Anthropic's models simply followed an unintended but open network path. Anthropic also emphasized that it discovered these incidents through its own proactive internal review rather than external detection by victims—suggesting the affected companies remained unaware of the access.

